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Abstract
Online Reputation Systems help mitigate the information asymmetry
between clients and providers in Cloud Computing Markets. However,
those systems raise two main drawbacks: the disagreement for assuming
the cost of ownership of such services and their vulnerability to reputa-
tion attacks from dishonest parties that want to increase their reputation.
This article faces both problems by describing a decentralised (peer-to-
peer) trust model that does not require the intervention of a central en-
tity to manage it. This model includes mechanisms to allow participants
to avoid dishonest behaviour from other peers: each client statistically
analyses the external reports about providers and updates the trustwor-
thiness of the peers. The trustworthiness values will be used to negotiate
prices in later transactions. The trust model is then incorporated in the
Service-Level Agreement negotiation and enforcement processes, prioritis-
ing trusted clients over non-trusted clients to minimise the consequences
of low Quality of Service in relation to the trust of the provider, and incen-
tivise accurate trust reports from the clients. Finally, this article evaluates
and discusses the validity of the trust model under different attacks from
dishonest clients and providers.
1 Introduction
Online reputation systems help mitigate the information asymmetry between
clients and providers in the markets. With the popularisation of the World Wide
Web, sites such as eBay [2] allow their users to submit and consult information
about the quality of products or the trustworthiness of both buyers and sellers.
Such reputation systems enforce the confidence between parties and boost the
number of commercial transactions.
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This model has been also ported to Utility Computing Markets [4]. In Utility
Computing Markets, both resource users and providers are autonomous agents
that negotiate the terms of the Quality of Service (QoS) and the price that the
client will pay to the provider for hosting their tasks or services [14]. When
the negotiation is finished, the terms of the contract are established in a Ser-
vice Level Agreement (SLA). The most successful implementation of the Utility
Computing paradigm is Cloud Computing, thanks to features of virtualisation
such as isolation of Virtual Machines (VMs), secure access to VMs with admin-
istrative privileges, and on-demand variation of the allocated resources.
Cloud Providers can violate the agreed SLAs by several reasons, such as high
load of resources, poor admission control, or dishonest behaviour. We suggest
the use of a reputation system to help clients choose a provider and allow them
to avoid the providers with low QoS.
Traditional Web reputation systems are based on reports from humans. This
service can be part of a site (e.g. eBay reputation) or an independent site.
They have clear business models: they increase the trust level to boost the
economic transactions; also the service provider may get paid by advertisement.
The incomes from the business model will amortise the cost of providing the
reputation service.
However, the aforementioned business model is not directly portable to
Cloud Computing markets because the users and the providers of the resources
are autonomous agents that are neither able to communicate nor understand
the human language; in addition, they are not a target for advertising cam-
paigns and the provider of the reputation service cannot make business from
advertising. This raises two issues: (i) opinions about Cloud providers must be
modelled to allow their automatic processing; (ii) if there is no business model
for a reputation service, nobody will provide it. There is much related work
about modelling a reputation service (see Section 2), but the need of making it
economically feasible must be faced.
Reputation systems are vulnerable to reputation attacks [10]: dishonest com-
panies can send biased opinions to increase their reputation or to decrease the
reputation of their competitors. Such behaviour can be mitigated in traditional
reputation systems by moderating the opinions. In addition, most users would
be smart enough to discard the dishonest reports. None of these methods can
be applied to a decentralised, automated agent-based reputation system.
Reputation allows markets to exclude dishonest providers. However, spot
failures or system outages may also decrease the reputation of honest providers.
These outages have a double economic impact: the provider must pay penalties
for the VMs whose QoS has not been fulfilled, and he will lose future clients
due to the loss of reputation. For this reason, providers operating in a Cloud
Computing market require trust-aware management policies aimed at retaining
their reputation when unexpected failures occur.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• Definition of a trust model that applies to a Cloud Computing business
model and is easily implementable in a decentralised Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
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network [7]. Our P2P configuration avoids the intervention of any central
authority or super-peers, which are a potential source of manipulation
of the reports. Peers ask for information about the providers by means
of a query flooding variation that is optimised with probabilistic routing
tables to enhance its scalability [12]. The trust model is composed by two
facets: direct trust, based in previous experiences between a client and a
provider; and reputation trust, based in the information that the peers of
a client provide about a provider. The cost of providing such service is
not assumed by any central organisation; it is proportionally assumed by
all the actors in the system. The model uses statistical analysis to allow
market participants to detect dishonest behaviours from other peers that
want to bias the true reputation of a provider.
• Evaluation of the operation of Cloud infrastructures that considers the im-
pact of the reputation in the revenue and definition of policies to minimise
the impact of system failures in the reputation. On one side, we enable
the provider to discriminate clients according to their reputation to favour
those with high reputation under some conflicting situations, since those
clients will impact positively on its reputation. On the other side, the
provider analyses the impact of management actions in its reputation and
its revenue every time it has to make a decision.
• Evaluation and discussion of the vulnerability of the reputation system
toward different attacks: self-promoting, slandering, orchestrated attacks,
whitewashing, and denial of service.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: after the presentation of the
related work, Section 3 describes the mathematical model created for describ-
ing the reputation of Cloud Computing providers. Section 4 proposes a set of
policies to allow providers considering their reputation during the negotiation
and enforcement of SLAs. After the experimental validation of the model from
both clients and provider side in Section 5, Section 6 discusses the requirements
for implementing such system in a real Cloud market. At the end, we expose
the conclusions and our future research lines.
2 Related work
Our previous work [16] showed the importance of the reputation for a provider.
Maintaining a high reputation is a key factor to maximise the revenue of providers
in Utility Computing Markets. We introduced a centralised proof-of-concept re-
putation architecture that relied on simple reputation models and ideal market
conditions. This article intends to go a step further: we add multiple reputation
terms and a decentralised architecture that is robust to dishonest market actors.
This article adopts some ideas from Azzedin et al. [5] and Alnemr et al. [3]:
we differentiate between direct trust and reputation trust; we consider multiple
provider facets to evaluate our trust methods; we also consider the trust factor
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to a recommender. Azzedin et al. provide a reputation model, but they do not
detail how that would be implemented. This article provides a pure mathemati-
cal model that is easily computable. We detail and discuss some practical issues
to implement it in real platforms.
Rana et al. [22] monitor reputation from three points of view: Trusted Third
Party, Trusted Module at Service Provider, and Model at Client Site. They
introduce the figure of a trusted mediator to solve conflicts between parties.
The main issue with their approach is the difficulty to find some company or
institution that is willing to host and maintain the trusted mediator, because
the business model is not clear. Therefore, our article suggest a purely P2P
reputation mechanism.
This article adopts various facets from the model of Xiong et al. [26] to
ensure the credibility of a feedback from a peer: number of transactions and
transaction context. We agree with the necessity of a community-context factor
to incentivise peers for reporting true feedbacks. This article differs from the
work of Xiong et al. because we are focusing the particularities of current Cloud
Computing markets: multiple SLOs, providers that are not integrated with the
reputation system, and trust relations that are classified in two types: trust on
peers (for consultancy) and trust on providers (for commercial exchange).
Yu et al. [27] define a model in which reputation propagates through net-
works. They define a trust propagation operator that defines how trust propa-
gates from a source peer (who reports the trust) to a destination peer in multiple
steps. Unlike our article, their model assumes the same trust both for service
provision and trust report, and they do not update the trust on peers in function
of the honesty of their reports.
The need of avoiding dishonest opinions in reputation systems was firstly
raised by Kerr et al. [10]. In their work, they show several reputation attacks
to allow dishonest peers to increase their revenue. They argue that the notion
of ‘security by obscurity’ does not prevent attackers from cheating successfully.
Our article shows a method for protecting honest clients from dishonest peers
that is complementary to other existing security mechanisms.
Our article discusses the need to motivate users to perform true reports about
the QoS of the providers. There are many proposals to motivate users to report
true validations, e.g. micro payments as reward for the true reports [21, 9].
These incentives are part of the reputation system. Such central entity that
pays clients is not feasible in a decentralised, peer-to-peer reputation system.
In our work, the incentives are enforced by the actors of such system: clients
may discriminate providers or peers that are behaving dishonestly.
3 Description of the reputation model
In our reputation model, every time a client wants to acquire information about
the reputation of a provider, it must query the rest of peers in the P2P network
and the peers that have previous experiences about it. The aim of this paper is
not to define and implement in detail a P2P architecture, but we propose the
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following aspects to define our P2P architecture:
Routing. P2P networks must implement some form of virtual overlay net-
work [13]. Such overlay networks can be structured or unstructured. In
structured P2P networks, the overlay is organized into a specific topology
(e.g. a tree). They usually implement a distributed hash table (DHT)
which stores key/pair values that associate a given information with the
peer that owns it. Looking for the information of a Cloud Provider with
DHTs is efficient, but DHTs are not robust in networks where peers fre-
quently join and leave the network. Unstructured networks, which are
built over randomised topologies, are easy to build and highly robust to
networks with high rate of peers that join and leave the network. This
paper suggests an unstructured topology, since it does not require the
intervention of any central tracker or super-peer, which would be a point
for potential attacks to the network. However, looking up for the repu-
tation information about cloud providers is complex in unstructured P2P
networks.
Information lookup. An unstructured topology requires a method to look for
the information across the entire P2P network [13]. Query flooding is a
simple method to look for information by broadcasting queries across the
entire network. It is effective in highly-replicated contents but not in rare
items. In addition, it has a poor scalability. The addition of probabilistic
tables for query routing [12] will increase the efficiency and scalability of
unstructured P2P networks.
There are two main reasons to implement our model as an unstructured P2P
network instead of a centralised reputation service:
• It is not clear that a subscription fee for such service is suitable for small
users, and advertising cannot be targeted to the market participants,
which are autonomous computer programs. An open, transparent, and
neutral reputation service is economically feasible in P2P networks where
the cost of the service is shared among all the participants. The expected
benefit by using the service will encourage each participant to bear this
cost.
• A centralised reputation service (or a P2P network with central trackers
or super-peers) could lead to having central entities that are owned by a
dishonest Cloud Provider, which could discard reports that would penalise
it or benefit its competitors.
There are currently some centralised Cloud Reputation services that have a
clear Business Model (e.g. CloudHarmony [1]), but they are oriented to aggre-
gate all the information of the most popular providers. They provide a set of
benchmarks that are executed in such limited set of providers and report their
status.
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As explained in the introduction, the framework of our research are open
Utility Computing Markets [4]. Such markets are dynamic: any small provider
can spontaneously enter in the market and they must be automatically consid-
ered by the reputation system (for example, a company with few hosts for its
internal use may sell its spare resources at night to help amortizing the cost
of its infrastructure). This scenario limits the effectiveness of CloudHarmony
model because the next reasons:
• The registry of providers must be automatically updated to consider small
providers that dynamically enter and leave the market.
• It is expected a large number of providers with a limited number of re-
sources. It is not clear that is technically feasible to execute benchmarks
periodically in all the providers. Our model suggests that the previous
experiences from other users are actually the benchmarks.
• Services like CloudHarmony consider a limited number of providers that
are proven to be honest. In an open Utility Computing market, a dishonest
provider could provide a good QoS to the centralized reputation systems
and a low QoS to other clients.
3.1 Trust towards a provider
Let
−→
U = (u1, u2, . . . , un) and
−→
V = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) be two vectors that contain
n elements. The Element-wise Product is defined as
−→
U −→V = (u1v1, . . . , unvn)
and the Element-wise Division is defined as
−→
U −→V = (u1/v1, u2/v2, . . . , un/vn).
Let CP = {cp1, cp2, . . . , cpm} be the set of m Cloud Providers that are
competing in a market to sell their resources to the clients.
Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} be the set of n clients that want to host their services
or tasks in the set CP of Cloud providers. Each client cx communicates to a
set of peers, represented by the set Px = {px1 , px2 , . . . , pxr}, formed by r peers of
client cx. Each peer is also a client (Px ⊆ C). The peer-direct communication
between clients is established by means of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks [7].
When a client wants to buy a resource, it sends an offer to the providers to
start a negotiation and to agree an SLA, which is described as {−→S ,∆t, Rev(vt)}.−→
S = (s1, . . . , sk) are the Service Level Objectives (SLOs) that describe the
amount of resources or the QoS terms to be purchased by the client. Each
s∗ term represents the number of CPUs, memory, disk, network bandwidth,
and so on. ∆t is the time period during which the task will be allocated in
the VM. Rev(vt) is a revenue function that describes how much money the
provider earns or loses after finishing a task. The Violation Time (vt) is the
amount of time in which the provider has not provided the agreed QoS to the
client. Let MR be the Maximum Revenue, MP be the Maximum Penalty (a
negative revenue), MPT be the Maximum Penalty Threshold, and MRT be
the Maximum Revenue Threshold, we describe our revenue function as follows:
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Figure 1: Revenue of a SLA as a function of the violation time (Equation 1).
Rev(vt) =
MP −MR
MPT −MRT (vt−MRT ) +MR (1)
Figure 1 graphically represents the possible values of Equation 1. Equation
1 allows a grace period where the provider can violate the SLA without being
penalized. If vt ≤MRT , the provider will get all the negotiated revenue (MR);
if vt ≥ MPT , the provider will pay the maximum penalty (MP ); for MRT >
vt > MPT the money to earn or the penalty to pay will be between MR and
MP , as a function of vt (see Figure 1). The Maximum Penalty MP is defined
to avoid infinite penalties. Client and provider can negotiate the values of
MRT , MR, MPT , MP for establishing different QoS ranges that would report
different revenues and penalties. Please refer to Section 5 for more details about
Rev(vt) and its concrete values. Note that our trust model is independent of
this revenue model, which is used for demonstration purposes. This means that
the trust model could be used in scenarios with other revenue models, while still
being useful for clients and providers.
Both Cloud clients and providers are entities that have a degree of trust
between them as individuals. The degree of trust can be expressed in multiple
terms, represented as a Trust Vector: a client trusts a provider in multiple
facets, related to the different terms of
−→
S (e.g. a Cloud provider could provide
resources that are suitable for CPU-intensive applications but unstable in terms
of network connection). Let
−→
T (A,B) = (t1, . . . , tk) be the Trust Vector from
the entity A to the entity B. This is, how much A trusts B. Both A and B belong
to CP or C.−→
T (A,B) = ω1
−→
D(A,B) +ω2
−→
R (B); this is, the overall trust from A to B has
two components:
−→
D(A,B) is the direct trust from A to B, which is built based
on previous experiences between A and B;
−→
R (B) is the reputation trust, which
is calculated by asking the set of peers of entity A (PA) about their experiences
with B (see Section 3.2, Equation 3). In plain words, the direct trust is what A
directly knows about B and the reputation trust is what the others say about B.
ω1 and ω2 are used to weigh how much importance the client assigns to each of
the terms, and may vary in function of each particular client. All the terms of−→
T ,
−→
D and
−→
R are real numbers between 0 (no trust) and 1 (maximum trust).
Because trust and reputation have many terms, a provider could deserve
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high trust when considering some SLOs and low trust when considering others.
This does not have to be detrimental to a given client. For example, a provider
that deserves high trust only in terms of CPU could not be suitable for many
applications such as Web services or databases, but could be suitable for some
CPU-intensive scientific applications. Some types of workloads can be allocated
on such providers with a high degree of trustworthiness. This raises a ques-
tion: which incentive would clients have for allocating their workloads in such
providers? Would it not be better to allocate them in providers whose trust level
is high in all the terms of
−→
T (A,B)? The response would be affirmative if there
were no economic incentives for the clients. Previous work from the authors
[17, 15, 19] show the economic benefit for both clients and providers of dynam-
ically negotiating the prices in function of many factors, such as offer/demand
ratio, allocated resources or QoS, and how those prices could vary in function
of the reputation of the provider [16]. If a provider is able to guarantee the QoS
requirements of a client at lower prices, the client will have incentive to allocate
its workloads there; even if the provider has low reputation in factors that are
not important to the client.
Considering the above, each client cx has its own Trust Weight Vector
−→
I (cx),
which weighs each of the SLOs of
−→
T (A,B) in function of the importance the
client assigns to each of them. The Element-Wise product
−→
T (cx, cpy)−→I (cx)
returns a vector that scores how trustworthy the provider cpy is in function of
three facets: the reputation of cpy, the direct trust from cx to cpy and the QoS
needs of cx. All the terms of
−→
I are real numbers between 0 and 1.
Let Score(SLA, cx, cpy) be a function that scores the suitability of the
provider cpy in function of the SLA and the trust from client cx to provider
cpy. For each SLA negotiation, the client will choose the provider whose Score
is the highest.
The definition of Scorexy may vary depending on the client policies and nego-
tiation strategies. For evaluating the validity of the model, the clients evaluated
in this article score the providers according to Equation 2. In this equation, the
scores are always negative. The nearer to 0 the better score. The client divides
the calculated trust from cx to cpy by the Trust Weight Vector (element-wise
division), and the negative of the magnitude of the resulting vector gives a scor-
ing that shows how trustworthy a provider is for the preferences of cx. This
score is divided by the price: the client would accept sending tasks to providers
to which the trust is lower if the price they establish is low enough.
Score(SLA, cx, cpy) = −
∥∥∥−→T (cx, cpy)−→I (cx)∥∥∥
Price
(2)
The scoring function in Equation 2 will incentivise providers to keep its
maximum trust level and, if not possible, to lower prices.
8
3.2 Defence against reputation attacks
A Cloud Provider can violate an SLA because of technical failures [25], errors
in the calculation of the number of resources to provide [15, 19], or dishonest
behaviour. The reputation model described in this article is intended to alert
the market participants when a provider is not fulfilling its agreed SLAs.
However, dishonest providers could enable fake clients to perform reputation
attacks towards the system to artificially increase their own reputation and/or
decrease the reputation of their competitors. Because our reputation model is
decentralised and unmanaged, the clients need a model to prevent reputation
attacks from dishonest peers.
Let T (cx, py) be a single-term trust relation from a client cx ∈ C to one of
its peers py ∈ Px. Let P zx = {pz1, . . . , pzs} ⊆ Px the subset of s peers of cx that
have any direct trust relation to provider cpz (this is, they can report previous
experiences with cpz), the Reputation Trust from cx to cpz is calculated as:
−→
R (cx, cpz) =
S∑
y=1
(
T (cx, p
z
y) ·
−→
D(pzy, cpz)
)

S∑
y=1
−→
T (cx, p
z
y) (3)
Equation 3 is calculated by asking the peers that have some direct relation
with cpz and weighing their reports by the direct trust from the client to its
peers. The report of a client to which there is high trust has more weight than
the report of a client to which there is low trust. The key issue is to establish
this trust relation between a client and its peers to avoid dishonest behaviours
and give more consideration to the accurate reports.
The trust relation between a client and its peers is continuously updated
based on the next assumption: most peers are honest and, when asked, they
report their true validation to the provider. Related work considers many incen-
tives to peers for reporting honestly [28, 11]. Our contribution is complimentary
to them, since we deal with the minimisation of the impact of the dishonest re-
ports.
Assuming the aforementioned, the trust from a client to each of its peers is
calculated according to Algorithm 1:
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begin
The average values and the variances of all the reports from the peers
of the P zx set are stored, respectively, in
−→
A and
−→
Σ2 = (σ21 , . . . , σ
2
s);
foreach pzy in P
z
x do−→
F ← −→A −−→D(pzy, cpz) = (a1 − d1, . . . , as − ds);
foreach |an − dn| in −→F do
if |an − dn| > α · σ2n then
Decrease T (cx, py);
else
Increase T (cx, py);
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Updating trust from cx to all its peers.
To detect potentially bad reputations, Algorithm 1 checks which peers re-
ported a reputation value which is far from the other reports for the same
provider. Note that we tag this as a potential bad reputation because, by any
reason, an honest peer could have been provided with bad QoS while the others
could not: because a punctual failure, or because the provider starts to under-
provision QoS by an outage or because it starts to behave dishonestly when its
reputation is high enough. These cases must not penalise too much the peer
that begins to report different than the other peers. Only repetitive reports
that are different will decrease considerably the reputation of a peer.
There are two parts of Algorithm 1 that will depend on the client policies. α
multiplies the variance of the trust reports, and indicates how tolerant the client
is with the specific reports that are far from the average. The lower α the lower
tolerance. The other part that depends on the client policy is the function to
increase or decrease the trust on a peer. In this article we have used a piecewise-
defined function that multiplies T (cx, py) depending on how far the trust report
was from the average. If there is no difference from a report to the average of
all the other reports, the trust relation is multiplied by MAX REWARD > 1.
The trust relation is not affected when |an − dn| = α · σ2n. If |an − dn| > α · σ2n,
the trust relation is multiplied to a minimum of MAX PENALTY < 1.
Despite of the simplicity of this function to increase or decrease the trust
on a peer, it is proven as effective in the evaluation (Section 5). Figure 2
shows that the slope of the linear function that penalises the trust is less pro-
nounced than the slope of the linear function that rewards the trust. In addition,
MAX PENALTY+MAX REWARD
2 < 1. There are two reasons: (1) the imbalance
between MAX PENALTY and MAX REWARD will complicate that dis-
honest peers recover easily their trust; and (2) honest peers that, by any reason,
punctually report values near α · σ2n are not penalised with severity. Early ex-
periments demonstrated that not defining a function in intervals with different
slopes would entail too much instability in the trust updating, and honest peers
would lose their trust without good reasons.
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Figure 2: Function to multiply the trust to a given peer, based on its previous
report.
When the trust to a peer reaches 0, it is definitely expelled from the trust
ring of the client, and its trust cannot be recovered any more.
4 Reputation-aware SLA negotiation and enforce-
ment
As proven in previous work [16], low reputation decreases the revenue of a
provider: the lower trust the less clients will pay for a service. In other words,
if two providers offer the same QoS at equal prices, the client will choose the
provider whose reputation is the highest. By this reason, a provider needs to
adjust its price to its real reputation due to the effects of market competition.
Our previous work showed that prices may be dynamically decided in function
of many facets, such as number of resources, QoS, client relationship, and mar-
ket status [15, 17, 19, 18, 20]. This article also defends the need to consider
reputation as an additional facet when the provider negotiates an SLA with the
client, because adjusting the revenue to the reputation will allow providers to
maximise their benefit when reputation is high and sell its resources when re-
putation is low; in addition, selling the resources when reputation is low allows
a provider to recover its reputation.
Pricing in function of trust involves two key issues that must be solved:
• Calculating the trust from a given client. As seen in Section 3.1, the trust
from a client to a provider depends on several factors: the direct trust,
the reputation as reported by all peers, the Trust Weight Vector, and the
weights that a particular client assigns to both direct trust and reputation.
Direct Trust and Reputation can be approximated statistically, but all the
weights are completely private parameters that depend on the preferences
of the client.
• Defining a pricing function. Each provider must determine the influence
of trust in the offered prices. There is lack of information about the prefer-
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ences of the clients towards the trust of the providers. Our previous work
demonstrated that Genetic Algorithms [18] are suitable to offer prices in
markets with hidden information, because they rapidly adapt the pricing
function to a changing/unknown environment. However, for simplification
purposes, the simulations in this article use linear correlations between re-
putation and price [16].
A provider does not know the model that each client is using to evaluate and
report the QoS, so it is difficult to know how its actions will affect its reputation.
But it can know that the higher QoS is provided to a client the higher trust
values will be reported to the reputation system; unless the client is behaving
dishonestly and reporting false values.
The reputation system in this article is open and peer-to-peer oriented, and
allows each of the participants of the system to know the reputation of the
provider, but also helps identifying those clients that are reporting false valua-
tions of the service.
In this work, we propose to maximise the reputation as a key objective
that will help providers increase their revenue due to the enforcement of the
trust relation with their clients. Considering all the actions and policies that a
provider can trigger to maximise its reputation, we classify them in two groups:
1. Policies that minimise the impact on reputation derived from SLA vio-
lations. This group of policies selectively violates SLAs (to not provide
the agreed QoS during a period of time, but restoring it when possible)
or cancels SLAs (to not provide any service or resource until the SLA
expires).
2. Policies that allocate/redistribute VMs to increase the success rate of the
policies of the first group. If a physical node hosts VMs from users with
similar trustworthiness, and this node is overloaded, it would be difficult
to select which violations have less impact on the reputation, because all
the violated SLAs would have a similar impact on the future reputation
of the provider. The policies in this article are applied by discriminat-
ing/classifying users during provisioning time or redistributing VMs at
runtime by migrating them, in order to unbalance the trustworthiness of
the users in the same host, and increasing the probability of violating first
the SLAs from users with low trustworthiness in case an SLA must be
violated.
We consider the policies from the first group: selective SLA violation and/or
cancellation: to prioritise trustworthy users under certain extreme situations in
which a set of SLAs that are already allocated must be violated temporarily
or directly cancelled by some reason (e.g. errors in the resource provisioning
process [19, 20] or a hardware failure that makes part of the physical resources
unavailable). Such policies would not increase the reputation of a provider, but
they would minimise the negative impact of the violations under some unavoid-
able scenarios (e.g. a system outage).
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When the monitoring system of a Cloud provider detects that there are not
enough resources to fulfil the QoS of all the VMs in a given node, the process
described in Algorithm 2 is triggered.
Data: list of running VMs in a given node
1 order VMs according to a given criterion;
2 n:=0;
3 while workload > 100% do
4 pause VM n from the ordered list during t seconds;
5 n:=n+1;
6 end
Algorithm 2: Generic algorithm for Selective SLA Violation/Cancellation in
each node.
For reputation maximisation policies, the criterion to order VMs (line 1) is
the trustworthiness to the client that owns it. To calculate the trustworthiness
to a client, the provider can enter in the reputation system as a normal peer, and
poll several clients about several providers. If a given client is usually reporting
values that are far away from the average, it will be considered unreliable.
The value of t will determine if the SLA is violated (t < time until SLA
expires) or cancelled (t ≥ time until SLA expires). During normal operation, t
is always the time until monitoring data is updated with new values. During
other severe problems, such as hardware failures, the VMs running in the nodes
with problems are directly cancelled.
In addition to the discrimination of users according to their trustfulness for
maximising the reputation of the provider, Algorithm 2 is generic enough to be
triggered for achieving other Business-Level Objectives, such as maximisation of
the profit or classification of clients according other business criteria [20]. The
following section will evaluate the effectiveness of the reputation maximisation
policy when compared with the Selective violation of SLAs according to other
Business-Level Objectives.
As we will show in Section 5.2.3 the criteria for ordering VMs may be dy-
namically switched depending on the context of the resources operation. In
the evaluation in Section 5.2.3, the provider uses revenue maximisation during
normal operation, and switches to reputation maximisation when it detects a
hardware failure in the nodes.
We must emphasise that our policy proposes to cancel SLAs only when the
provider is not able to fulfil them all. This should be infrequent, used only when
the violation is unavoidable, because the economic penalty is paid whatever the
client trustworthiness is. For example, when a system outage occurs and a
critical part of the hardware resources are unavailable during a period of time,
SLA violations cannot be avoided. The idea is at least to minimise the impact
on the reputation of the provider. A bad usage of this policy could make the
clients lose the confidence in the provider, thus losing profit.
Finally, one might think that a client with a cancelled SLA would be un-
satisfied and move to other providers instead of making repeated transactions
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in the same provider. This specific study assumes that the clients of the Cloud
Market are represented by autonomous, agent-based, decision makers that do
not implement the usual human rationality but a mathematical model that cal-
culates whether it is beneficial to repeat a transaction in a provider that did
not fulfil an SLA in the past.
5 Experiments
5.1 Simulation environment
The experiments in this article have been performed in simulated environments
instead of real testbeds because each single experiment on a real testbed would
require to completely occupy a large data centre during days or weeks to get
data that is statistically relevant enough. In addition, it would be difficult
to get actual users involved in the system to use these resources and provide
actual trust reports. We have created a simulator [24] that is available online
to facilitate replicating the experiments. Its design comprehends two levels:
market and resource fabrics.
Market-level simulation. A marketplace is a service that allows both clients
and providers to meet and negotiate SLAs. Our simulated environment does not
consider the particularities of the market implementation, and represents the
market as a directory of providers and customers where, each time a client wants
to buy cloud resources, the following process is triggered: 1) The client sends
a SLA template like the one described in Section 3, but excluding the revenue
information. 2) The market forwards the client request to the providers. 3) Each
provider checks whether it can fulfil the SLA and, in case it can, it calculates the
price and allocation that maximises its utility (as discussed in Section 4) and
returns the offer to the client. 4) The client asks its peers for the reputation
of the providers that returned a price. 5) The client scores all the providers
according to Equation 2. It reaches an agreement with the provider whose score
is the highest. 6) The client updates its trust to its peers according to Equation
3. When the task is executed, it also updated its direct trust relation to the
provider in function of the actual QoS.
Resource fabrics simulation. During the simulation of the allocation and
operation of SLAs in a Cloud Provider, the following components operate in
parallel:
• SLA Enforcer continuously watches the fulfilment of SLAs. If an SLA is
not being fulfilled during a time slot, SLA Enforcer updates its violation
time (Equation 1), which will be considered during the accounting process.
• Accounting updates the financial status of the provider when it finishes
the execution of an SLA. It stores some statistical information such as
profit or losses, number of violations, number of operated SLAs, etc.
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• Virtual Machine, which takes a portion of the resources (memory, CPU,
disk, network ...) of a physical host. At every moment, the simulator
accounts the load of its assigned resources. A physical machine can handle
a given maximum workload. When the VM has not enough resources to
handle the workload (e.g. too much requests during the operation of a
Web workload), SLA Enforcer is notified.
• Physical node. A Cloud Provider owns many physical nodes. Each phys-
ical node handles none or several Virtual Machines. When the sum of
loads from all the VMs is higher than the total workload the node can af-
ford, some of the VMs will violate their respective SLAs. The number and
distribution of such violations would depend on the policies the provider
specifies to deal with SLA violations. In addition, a physical node could
temporarily fail due to hardware failures. When a physical node fails,
all the VMs that were running on it are stopped and, as a result, SLA
Enforcer handles the violation of their respective SLAs.
The clients look for resources to allocate their tasks in the providers that fit
their QoS requirements. The experiments consider three SLOs: CPU, disk, and
network bandwidth, which are terms of the Trust Vector and the Trust Weigth
Vector.
The simulation can be configured according to some parameters, namely i)
the length of the simulated time, ii) the probabilistic distribution of the work-
loads of the clients (how many clients are accessing the market, how many
resources they require at each moment, wether the demand pattern is constant
or daily/weekly-variable, and how the resources are linked), iii) the business
configuration of the clients (their required QoS, their trust, and their reputa-
tion), iv) the parameters of the policies (the thresholds of Equation 1, how the
clients weigh the importance of the different types of resources for their appli-
cations, and how clients and providers weigh their trust relations between them
according to Equation 3), and v) the probabilistic distribution of the failures of
resources.
The trustworthiness of the clients follows a folded normal distribution with
mean=0.5 and standard deviation=0.2. This means that most clients have trust
values near 1 and a few clients are reporting dishonestly. The values for Rev(vt)
are: MRT = 0.05 (that means that if the agreed QoS is not provided during
the 5% of the time or less, the SLA is not considered as violated); MPT = 0.3
(when the agreed QoS is not provided during the 30% of time or more, the
SLA is completely violated); MR is dynamically established according to
−→
S
and the market status [15]; MP = −1.5MR (if the provider completely violates
an SLA, it must pay back the 150% of the price that the client paid initially).
The honest providers normally provide 100% of the agreed QoS during off-peak
hours and around 97% during peak hours. The workload follows a web pattern
(Figure 3) that varies depending on the hour of the day and the day of the week:
there are more requests from Monday to Friday evening than during the late
night or the weekend. The Web workload pattern corresponds to the access log
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Figure 3: Web workload pattern
of an ISP within our university domain and the exact data source cannot be
disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. At the beginning of the experiments, all
providers and clients have an initial direct trust of 0.5. The start-up time since
the initial trust values converge to their real values is not considered for clients,
and it is initially mitigated at provider side with price discounts as a function
of the initial trust. Other parameter values are described in their respective
experiments.
The simulations rely on constant values that do not intend to reflect real
market data, but to evaluate the model in terms of relative values and tenden-
cies. There are no available traces from real commercial Cloud markets that
would allow us to realistically adjust the aforementioned parameters. We do
not expect to reproduce realistic scenarios, because Cloud markets are yet ex-
perimental and we cannot define what is realistic. In the experiments of this
article, the values are set according to a main criterion: to provide results that
are statistically relevant and proportional to the variations of the inputs. Be-
fore the definitive parameters are set, the simulations have been repeated many
times to tune some parameters. For example, the maximum load value for
the Web workloads must be set to force providers violating enough SLAs to
get comparative information between policies. In this case, it is not important
to know the exact number of SLAs that a provider violates when it applies a
given policy (because it could vary in different market scenarios), but to check
whether applying a given policy will decrease the number of violations, and the
magnitude of the reduction (e.g. 1-10%, 10-50%, ...).
5.2 Reputation-aware SLA negotiation and enforcement
5.2.1 Effect of hardware failures in reputation
In the first experiment, five providers are competing in a market during 100
simulation steps. As for the remaining experiments whose X axis is measured
as simulation steps, each step does not represent any time unit, but a cycle that
comprehends negotiation in the market, operation and enforcement of SLAs,
to see how the operation of SLAs affects in future negotiations. In this group
of experiments, the workload is constant at 100% of the resources capacity and
16
Figure 4: Reputation of providers upon failures and dishonest behaviours.
does not follow the web pattern, since the experiments are focused on measuring
the behaviour of the trust model and not the behaviour of the hosts with respect
to a given workload.
Four providers are honest and a single provider is behaving dishonestly: it
only provides the 60% of the QoS that it has previously agreed with the client.
In addition, one of the honest providers suffers an outage [25] in its network at
step 33. Therefore, it is providing 50% of its network capacity until step 67.
Figure 4 shows the average trust from the clients to the providers. All the
elements of the trust vectors are shown separately, but grouped as follows: the
trust terms corresponding to the SLOs of the dishonest provider are shown as
crosses; the trust element corresponding to the network of the provider that
suffers the outage is a continuous line; the trusts for the rest of SLOs are shown
as points. Figure 4 shows that the dishonest provider has a reputation pro-
portional to the percentage of agreed QoS that is providing. The market also
quickly notices that one of the providers is starting to provide a bad QoS in
network and, after a quick decrease of the reputation, it slowly converges to 0.5,
which corresponds to the percentage of QoS that is providing due to the outage.
When the provider solves its network problems, its reputation increases fast,
until it converges to the average reputation of the other SLOs.
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Group
−→
I (cx) = (icpu, idisk, inetwork)
1 (1, 1, 1)
2 (1, 0.3, 0.3)
3 (0.2, 0.8, 0.6)
4 (0.6, 0.3, 1)
Table 1: Values of the Trust Weight Vector for each group of clients
5.2.2 Effectiveness of Scoring function during SLA negotiation
To evaluate the effectiveness of Equation 2 as rule for selecting a suitable
provider while saving money, four providers are competing in a market for selling
CPU, disk and network bandwidth as SLOs: the first provider has the maximum
reputation in all the SLOs; the second provider has the maximum reputation in
all the SLOs but CPU; the third provider has the maximum reputation in all
the SLOs but disk; and the fourth provider has the maximum reputation in all
the SLOs but network. A group of 32 clients wants to submit their workloads
to the providers, so they score them in function of the trust, the Weight Vector,
and the price they ask. The 32 clients are divided in four groups depending
on how they weigh each SLO (see Table 1). Values of table would correspond
to different types of workloads, for example: applications with a balanced re-
source usage (Group 1), CPU-intensive applications that do neither intensively
use disk nor network (Group 2), database applications with intensive disk and
network usage (Group 3) or some kind of Web services that intensively use CPU
and network but not disk (Group 4). The values of Table 1 do not reflect any
real measure of workloads. Their purpose is to be varied to see how the scoring
function of Equation 2 behaves.
In the first few iterations of the experiment, the tasks are allocated in the
different providers pseudo-randomly. When the reputation of each provider is
near to their true QoS, the tasks allocation results as follows:
• All tasks from Group 1 are placed in the provider with maximum QoS in
all the SLOs. QoS is critical for this group and they are not willing to
allocate their tasks in other providers despite the lower prices.
• ∼50% of tasks from Group 2 are placed in the provider with low network
reputation and ∼50% in the provider with low disk reputation. Only CPU
is critical for this group.
• All tasks from Group 3 are placed in providers with low CPU reputation,
because other SLOs have high importance.
• All tasks from Group 4 are placed in the provider with low disk reputation,
because disk is the SLOs with the lowest importance.
The measured results tend to rounded numbers (e.g. 100% of tasks are
allocated in the same provider when the system becomes stable) because the
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experiment is repeated in a controlled simulation environment. A real market
would add some statistical variability to the results.
5.2.3 Reputation-aware SLA enforcement
To evaluate our reputation-aware SLA enforcement, we have simulated 5 days
of a market operation with three types of providers, according to their policy
for discriminating SLAs when the resources are overloaded (see Algorithm 2):
• A provider that randomly discards SLAs (Random). It is used as a base-
line for evaluating how the system would behave without any resource
operation policy.
• A provider that discards the SLAs that report less revenue (Revenue Max-
imisation). That has been demonstrated to be effective for maximising
the revenue of a provider [15].
• A provider that discards the SLAs from the clients to which there is low
trust (Reputation Maximisation).
To evaluate the different scenarios, we introduced a global outage of the data
centre at day 3 of the simulation. During the outage, the providers only have
20% of their actual resources. The outage has been programmed to happen
during a peak workload. That means that about 80% of the allocated SLAs are
to be violated during the outage.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the reputation for the three providers. Dur-
ing off-peak hours, when workload is low, the reputation is near the maximum
value for all the providers. During the peaks, the graph shows the effect of the
increase of SLA violations in the reputation. While the reputation maximisa-
tion policy keeps reputation near 1 during both peaks and off-peaks, the random
policy used as baseline clearly shows how the reputation decreases when no poli-
cies are applied. Although the revenue maximisation policy does not consider
reputation, it indirectly keeps it in the range between random and reputation
maximisation policies: the provider tries to pause first the VMs whose SLA
violation time is over the Maximum Revenue Threshold (MRT in Equation 1).
Therefore, it violates less SLAs and, indirectly, the reputation of the provider
is higher than the reputation of a provider that does not apply any policy.
The reputation is much lower in the three providers during the outage around
time step 2000 because around the 80% of the SLAs are violated. The difference
of reputation between revenue and reputation maximisation is proportionally
higher during the outage because the revenue maximisation provider cannot
keep SLA violations under MRT .
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the spot revenue over time for the three
providers. The revenue is expressed in a fictitious currency, because the rev-
enue information is only important in terms of tendencies and proportions. The
figure shows that during normal operation of resources, the revenue of the repu-
tation maximisation provider is slightly lower than the revenue of the revenue
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Figure 5: Evolution of reputation for three types of providers.
maximisation provider. A discussion topic comes up from this observation: is
reputation maximisation a true Business-Level Objective if it cannot maximise
the revenue? The answer could depend on the actual objectives of any organi-
sation. For example, organisations that want to keep service reliability as their
differentiating value need to maintain always the maximum reputation over the
long term.
However, Figure 6 shows that reputation maximisation policy has a real
impact on the revenue of the provider during the outage. After all, the reputa-
tion of the revenue maximisation provider is also high during normal operation
(> 0.9) and only the outage has a true impact on its reputation.
Considering the previous observations about Figure 6, we have introduced
a new provider that is context aware of the environment (normal operation or
outage) and dynamically switches the revenue/reputation maximisation policy
depending on what is expected to report the highest economic profit. Sum-
marising, the revenue maximisation policy is used when the provider is operat-
ing normally; if the monitoring information shows that there is an outage, the
provider switches to the reputation maximisation policy and returns back to
revenue maximisation policy when the systems are again in normal operation.
The simulation has been repeated with the three providers of the previous
section, plus the context-aware provider. In the figures of this section, the
random baseline provider has been removed to improve the readability of the
figures.
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Figure 6: Spot revenue of three types of providers.
Figure 7 shows only a time window of the global simulation, making it eas-
ier to visualise. It shows that the context-aware provider maintains a reputa-
tion rate similar to the revenue maximisation provider during normal operation
(which is high enough to get high revenue) and a rate similar to the reputa-
tion maximisation provider during the outage (to minimise the impact of low
reputation in revenue).
Our experiments show that the revenue of the context-aware policy is similar
to the revenue maximisation policy during normal operation. Figure 8 shows
the time window from the outage of the system to the time after the normal
operation of the provider has been re-established. Figure 8 shows that the
revenue of the context-aware policy is similar to the reputation maximisation
policy during an outage and the time after it, while the reputation of the provider
is being recovered.
Figures 7 and 8 show that the results for the context-aware policy look
slightly different than the corresponding policies because the behaviour of the
market varies in different simulations. The market is a complex system and its
behaviour is determined by some parameters that are defined using statistical
distributions. In addition, it is highly influenced by small differences in the
initial status and the actions of the other providers. Our article does not focus
on the absolute values of the results, but in the analysis of the tendencies.
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Figure 7: Evolution of reputation for three types of providers, including context-
aware policy switching.
5.3 Defence against reputation attacks
This article evaluates and discusses the behaviour of the trust and reputation
system towards a given set of reputation attacks [8]:
Self-promoting. A provider that is providing a low QoS infiltrates peers that
report high trust values for such provider. An infiltrated peer is a peer
that does not have real interest on acquiring Cloud services, but skewing
the true reputation of a provider, or a set of providers.
Slandering. A provider infiltrates peers that report low trust values for the
competitors, even if they are fulfilling all the SLAs.
Orchestrated attack. A group of peers is coordinated to perform self-promoting,
slandering, or both. We will consider a subtype of orchestrated attack
called oscillation attack : the attackers are divided in two teams. One
team behaves correctly to build their confidence from the other peers and
the other performs reputation attacks. After a moment, the roles are ex-
changed to recover the confidence for one group and maximize the impact
of the other.
Whitewashing. Dishonest peers abuse the system (self-promoting or slander-
ing) and then use any vulnerability of the system to avoid any decrease
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Figure 8: Spot revenue for three types of providers, including context-aware
policy switching, during and after an outage.
in their reputation. For example, they leave the system and enter again
with a new identity.
Denial of service. After a poor QoS provision, dishonest providers try to pre-
vent the calculation and dissemination of reputation values.
This section experimentally evaluates the behaviour of the system towards
self-promoting, slandering, and orchestration attacks. Section 6 discusses the
effectiveness of the system towards whitewashing and denial of service attacks.
5.3.1 Self-promoting
In this experiment, the market demand is made of 24 clients that negotiate
with the providers for allocating the workloads in the Cloud resources. Before
starting a negotiation with a provider, a client asks its peers for the reputation
of the provider, then weighs it with its direct trust (if any) and multiplies it
by the Trust Weight Vector
−→
I (cx). When the provider returns a price for a
requested amount of resources, the client evaluates it in function of the price
and the weighed trust.
When the client calculates the reputation of a provider, it tries to detect the
dishonest peers as explained in Section 1: it decreases or increases its trust to
each peer in function of what they report. This article does not intend to set
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Figure 9: Evaluation of trust to peers that perform Self-promoting.
the optimum values for MAX REWARD and MAX PENALTY constants
(Figure 2), so we have set MAX REWARD = 1.05 and MAX PENALTY =
0.8 as intuitive values for showing the tendencies. Different values would make
the trust to peers evolve quicker or slower.
In the experiment, the dishonest provider infiltrated two peers that report
trust values near 1 for the dishonest provider (while its real reputation should
be near 0.5). A peer is performing self-promotion from the beginning of the
simulation. The other peer waits until its trust to the other peers is near 1 to
maximize the impact of its false reports.
Figure 9 shows that, as initial state, all the peers of a given client have
a trust of 0.5. The dishonest client that reports false trust values from the
beginning (labelled as Self-promoter 1) increases its trust in the first simulation
steps because at this early stage there is no enough statistical information about
the self-promoting provider to discard the dishonest peer. After a few simulation
steps, the Self-promoter 1 is quickly expelled from the system. In the same way,
the Self-promoter 2 quickly decreases its trust as soon as it starts to report false
values (step 50).
5.3.2 Slandering
The configuration parameters of this experiment are the same as in the self-
promoting experiment. The only difference is that dishonest clients, instead of
reporting high values to its provider, report low values to the competitors (the
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Figure 10: Evaluation of trust to peers that perform Slandering.
50% of their actual QoS).
Figure 10 shows that, as initial state, all the peers of a given client have
a trust of 0.5. The first dishonest client is reporting false trust values from
the beginning, and it is quickly expelled from the list of peers (when it reaches
trust 0). The trust to all the other peers is increased, including the second
dishonest peer, whose strategy is to increase its reputation to maximise the
influence of its false trust reports in the future. When the second dishonest
client starts cheating at step 50, the client detects it and progressively decreases
its reputation until reaching the value 0 at step 59.
5.3.3 Orchestrated attack
In this experiment, a group of dishonest peers is coordinated to perform self-
promoting and slandering simultaneously. They report trust values near 1 to
the dishonest provider (while it is providing 50% of the agreed QoS) and the
50% of the actual trust to the honest providers.
The dishonest peers are coordinated to perform an oscillation attack : the
attackers are divided in two teams. During the first 10 simulation steps both
groups report true values to increase their trust to the other peers. After this
time, the first group starts reporting false values. When the trust of the first
group decreases below a given threshold (0.5 in the experiments), they start
reporting true values to recover their reputation and the attackers from the
second group, who preserved their high trust, start cheating until their trust
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Figure 11: Reputation of providers under oscillation attacks.
falls below 0.5 and the roles are exchanged again. This process is repeated
cyclically.
This experiment has been repeated with different honest/dishonest ratio of
peers. Figure 11 shows the average trust values for the honest providers as well
as the trust value for the dishonest provider. The results show that the influence
of the attackers on the real trust values for all the providers is negligible, even
when the percentage of cheaters in the system is 80% of the total number of
peers (which would be an absurd situation because honest peers would leave the
system).
The main reason for the low effectiveness of the attack is that the reputa-
tion decreases faster than it is recovered, as previously explained in Section 3.2
(Figure 2). Figure 12 shows the evolution of the trust of the two groups of
dishonest peers involved in the oscillation attack. Despite their trust oscillates
during some time, they finally tend to 0.
Paradoxically, a basic reputation attack without oscillation, where all the
attackers are performing the same reports, would be more effective in the unre-
alistic scenario where the dishonest provider manages to infiltrate a very high
number of attackers. Figure 13 shows that that the attackers do not influence
the system in scenarios where the honest peers are the majority. When the
percentage of cheaters reaches 40% of the total, the system collapses and the
reputation values do not reflect the true valuations of the honest peers.
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Figure 13: Reputation of providers under a basic orchestrated attack.
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6 Discussion: Implementing the model in a real
market
This article demonstrates the validity of the reputation model from an experi-
mental point of view. Since this article is focused on the definition of the model,
some implementation details are not considered from a formal view. This sec-
tion discusses the implementability of the model, and the conditions to allow
the reputation model being feasible from the trust and economic side.
The first point to discuss is how such a system can exist independent of the
service providers or their brokers as a decentralised system. Engaging such a
service would require that a consortium of Cloud providers defines and pub-
lishes an open protocol for P2P exchange of reputation information and builds
a community of users (both clients and providers) that potentially would bene-
fit from using it. This prospective benefit will encourage each actor to assume
proportionally the cost to operate the reputation system.
In addition, we identify the following requirements:
• A digitally-signed proof of purchase must be provided by peers that report
their trust to a provider. The proof of purchase could be a subset of the
agreed SLA, digitally signed by both client and provider. Note that there is
no need to store much detailed information about the identity, but simply
a unique identifier that remains immutable for every peer. Therefore, a
trustworthy Cloud Market requires certification authorities and identity
management, which will ensure that outside attackers cannot send trust
reports, and will also detect peers that try to change their identity.
• Quantify precisely the SLAs to measure whether the provider is allocating
all the resources to fulfil them. Some resources, such as CPU cycles, are
difficult to measure accurately from the client side. We suggest negotiating
in terms of high-level metrics (e.g. Web-services throughput) and then
translate such high-level metrics to low-level metrics by means of SLA
decomposition [6, 23].
The aforementioned requirements would increase the effectiveness of the sys-
tem towards reputation attacks. Identity management would minimise the im-
pact of whitewashing if the identities are digitally signed by trusted certification
authorities. Attaching the proof of purchase to a report would minimise the co-
ordinated attacks because their economic cost would be high. The decentralised
nature of the system would also avoid denial of service attacks, because there
is no way that providers prevent the dissemination of the trust values from the
peers.
No centralised component bears the cost of implementing our trust model.
The cost is shared by all the peers. The cost for each peer, in terms of memory
space and extra calculations, is as follows: let s be the number of SLOs in an
SLA; let r be the number of peers of a client; let m be the number of Cloud
providers. According to the model described in Section 3.1, the complexity of
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calculating the trust of all the providers is O(s ·m · r). According to Algorithm
1, the complexity of updating the trust from a client to all its peers is O(r · s).
In terms of space complexity, a client needs to store a O(m · s) map with all
the direct trust values to all the providers, and another O(r) map with all the
direct trust values to its peers.
The incentive-compatibility property of the mechanism must also be dis-
cussed. We suggest Cloud providers to penalise dishonest peers by increasing
the price of their resources for such type of peers. This has two positive ef-
fects on the market: peers are encouraged to report the true valuation of the
providers, and providers get an economic compensation for possible reputation
attacks, as if it were some kind of insurance.
7 Conclusions and Future work
This article describes a reputation model that deals with some open issues in
the state of the art. First, we propose a P2P architecture for dealing with
the cost of provision of centralised reputation services, which may be a good
architecture for other markets but not for Cloud Computing. Second, we define
a mathematical model to calculate the trust relation from a client to a provider.
This model also defines trust relations between peers and updates them using
statistical analysis to detect the trustworthiness of their reports.
In addition to the reputation and SLA negotiation model, we introduce a
policy to prioritise users according to their trustworthiness. This policy has a
double goal: (1) minimise the impact of the SLA violations in the reputation
of the provider and, therefore, in the revenue; and (2) motivate users to report
true valuations of the providers. This policy is not intended to motivate a
dishonest behaviour but to minimise the impact on the reputation when the
violation of an SLA is unavoidable. The common business objectives prevent
providers from only establishing SLAs with clients that give them good reviews,
or establishing a black list that contains clients with bad reports (even those who
are actually honest), because they would lose market share and decrease their
profit. In addition, the ignored clients would continue reporting bad reports
and the provider would have no chance to restore their trust to them.
The validity of the model is demonstrated through exhaustive experiments.
After analysing the policy in comparison with others, we show that providers
that behave honestly and apply revenue maximisation policies, in most cases
indirectly keep a good enough reputation rate and achieve higher revenue than
the providers that apply reputation maximisation. The benefits of reputation
maximisation in terms of revenue are noticeable under conditions that imply a
high rate of SLA violations. Considering the above, we introduce a new type
of provider that switches between reputation or revenue maximisation policies
depending on the context. This provider achieves the best revenue in all the
cases, and always keeps good-enough reputation rates. Our experiments showed
that policies that are unaware of the reputation may have economic losses during
system outages while policies that are aware of the reputation keep economic
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profits.
This article does not consider the ethical issues of using such policies to cheat
the clients with low reputation; also clients that recently joined the reputation
network.
A key issue of reputation systems is to motivate their users to report true
valuations of the providers. The policies of this article help incentivise such
behaviour because clients that report true valuations have high reputation to
their peers. Providers that want to keep high reputation will prioritise the
QoS for trustworthy clients under certain situations such as peaks of demand
or an outage. As a consequence, clients that want to benefit from this positive
discrimination will report true valuations of the providers. Since the reputation
model is peer-to-peer oriented, any provider could join a network for polling the
trustworthiness of a client.
This article also evaluated the behaviour of the system toward reputation
attacks. We can conclude that our system behaves reasonably well towards
self-promoting, slandering, and coordinated attacks (as experimentally demon-
strated in Section 5.3); fulfilling the implementation requirements exposed in
Section 6 would avoid whitewashing and denial of service attacks, as discussed
in that section.
This article opens a wide range of future work areas: the context-aware
provider must be improved with the addition of statistical analysis to dynami-
cally learn how the actions of the provider during negotiation and operation can
influence the future reputation. We also plan to improve the policy for selecting
the SLAs that are going to be violated. The objective is to achieve a policy that
is able to weigh both goals: reputation and revenue maximisation.
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